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Note From the Field
Trade, Monitoring, and the ILO: Working To
Improve Conditions in Cambodia's Garment
Factories
Kevin Kolbent
The U.S.-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement, signed
on January 20, 1999, was remarkable for its inclusion of a labor
standards provision that created incentives for the Cambodian
garment industry to bring itself into substantial compliance
with international labor standards and Cambodian labor law.
The labor standards provision provided the impetus for the
creation of a novel program, to be operated by the International
Labor Organization (ILO). This program combined trade-related
incentives to enforce workers' rights with an unprecedented plan
to have the ILO conduct factory-level monitoring of working
conditions. This Article examines how the program was
designed and implemented and evaluates the proposals and
conceptions that preceded the final project document. This
analysis provides a case study on how to construct and
implement future programs that combine trade and factory
monitoring to improve working conditions and enforce core
labor rights along the global supply chain.
t Incoming Assistant Professor, Rutgers Business School. B.A. 1994, Oberlin College;
M.A., J.D. 2002, University of Michigan. This article was written in large part while I was a
Senior Associate at Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights),
and travel funding was provided by the University of Michigan's program on Globalization,
Labor and Change. Many thanks to Robert Howse, Mark Barenberg, Christopher McCrudden,
and Laurie Berg for helpful critiques and constructive conversations during the writing and
research of this paper. Special thanks to Bama Athreya of the International Labor Rights Fund
for her insightful comments and for initially exposing me to the topic.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With a population of ten million people, an extremely small GDP, and
a fledgling export market, Cambodia is perhaps an unlikely candidate for
cutting-edge experiments in linking trade with labor rights. Nevertheless,
on January 20, 1999 the U.S. and Cambodian governments signed the
U.S./Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement. The Agreement was
remarkable for its inclusion of a labor standards provision creating
incentives for the Cambodian garment industry to bring itself into
substantial compliance with international labor standards and Cambodian
labor law. This compliance was to be facilitated through the creation of a
program to improve labor standards in the garment sector. The program
was eventually to be operated by the International Labor Organization
(ILO).2
The ILO's program in Cambodia is novel because it combines
approaches to enforcing and protecting labor rights normally thought of as
distinct because they target enforcement in two different realms. First, it
uses trade related incentives to enforce workers' rights. Scholars and
workers' rights advocates have argued that to achieve these ends trade
agreements ought to include workers' rights clauses that condition trading
privileges on enforcement of labor rights by signatories to the agreement .3
1 Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool, Man-made Fiber, Non-Cotton Vegetable
Fiber and Silk Blend Textiles and Textile Products Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Royal Government of Cambodia,
at http://www.tcc.mac.doc.gov/cgi-bin/doit.cgi?204:64:189233445:25 [hereinafter the
Agreement].
2 The ILO was created in 1919 and is a tripartite organization comprised of three
constituencies: governments, employers, and employees. The goal of the organization is to
promote social justice by promoting just working conditions. See Declaration Concerning the
Aims and Purposes of the International Labor Organization (Declaration of Philadelphia)
(1944), [Oct. 9, 1946,15 U.N.T.S. 35],
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm#annex (last visited Dec. 12. 2003).
3 See, e.g., SANDRA POLASKI, TRADE AND LABOR STANDARDS: A STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (2002); Marley Weiss, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back - Or Vice Versa: Labor Rights
Under Free Trade Agreements from NAFTA, Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin America, and
Beyond, 37 U.S.F.L. REV. 689 (2003). Some advocates argue for the adoption of a workers' rights
clause in the World Trade Organization. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE
TRADE UNIONS, BUILDING WORKERS' HUMAN RIGHTS INTO THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (1999)
(arguing for the adoption of a workers' rights clause in the World Trade Organization that
would establish a joint WTO/ILO advisory board to oversee its implementation). Others
argue that workers' rights can be protected in the WTO without a separate workers' rights
clause. See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 131 (arguing that a workers' rights clause is unnecessary because
Article XX of GATT 1947, providing for an exception to GATT rules in certain circumstances,
might be interpreted to allow for non-protectionist import restrictions on products made
under conditions that violate core labor rights). But see Adelle Blackett, Whither Social Clause?
Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty Interpretation, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1999)
(arguing there ought to be a side agreement clarifying that Article XX is to be interpreted to
include exceptions for such products). The United States and the European Union have
adopted mechanisms such as the Generalized System of Preferences to unilaterally condition
trade benefits to developing countries upon adequate enforcement of labor rights. See generally
Lance Compa & Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor Regulation and Trade Labor Rights in the Generalized
[Vol. 7
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This strategy is generally aimed at the public regulatory level: it aims to
compel states to enact and apply adequate public labor regulation. The
Cambodia project represents one of the first and most creative experiments
in linking trade privileges to the respect of labor rights in trade
agreements. 4
Second, the Cambodia project harnesses the power of factory level
monitoring of labor rights compliance. Some have suggested that the most
effective way to regulate and police global supply chains is to allow private
actors - usually corporations - to implement and monitor codes of conduct
along the supply chain.5 This strategy aims to improve respect for workers'
rights at the factory level, mostly outside of the public regulatory
framework. Some commentators and advocates, particularly trade unions,
have suggested that self-regulated codes of conduct are at best inadequate,
and at worst an insidious device to replace unions and public regulation
with voluntary enforcement by private actors.6 The Cambodia program is
unique within this debate because it is the ILO, an international
organization, that conducts the factory monitoring -not private companies
or NGOs. The program serves not only as a mechanism to report on labor
conditions in factories, but as a kind of supplement to and temporary
replacement for Cambodia's inadequate national regulatory system, which
does not, and perhaps cannot, enforce international labor standards or its
own labor law.7
In what follows, I examine the way in which the Cambodia ILO
monitoring program was designed and implemented, and analyze the
proposals and conceptions that preceded the final project document. My
purpose is three-fold. First, I describe how the Cambodia program
System of Preferences: A 20-Year Review, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 199 (2001). For a critique of
these unilateral measures, see Philip Alston, Unilateralism in U.S. Trade Policy, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond,
eds.) (1996).
4 The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), a side agreement to
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), preceded the U.S. Cambodia Bilateral
Textile Trade Agreement. However, it is only a side agreement; the text of NAFTA itself does
not include labor rights provisions. Moreover, many critics have argued that the NAALC
labor rights enforcement mechanisms are deficient. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 3, at 699.
5 See, e.g., Archon Fong, Dara O'Rourke, & Charles Sabel, Realizing Labor Standards,
BOSTON REvIEw, Feb./Mar. 2001, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR26.1/fung.html.
6 See Dara O'Rourke, Out Sourcing Regulation: Analyzing Non-Governmental Systems Of
Labor Standards And Monitoring, 31 POLY STUDIES J. 1, 3 (2003) (presenting arguments for and
against non-governmental factory monitoring).
7 The question of whether or not monitoring programs hamper or complement public
regulatory systems is an important issue that I do not have space adequately to address here.
It is a particularly acute issue for the ILO, which has traditionally acted as a capacity builder
of nations' regulatory capacity. Indeed, much of the conflict over the role of ILO as builder of
technical capacity versus factory monitor, which we will see reveal itself in Section IV, hinges
on this debate over the ILO's function. For an argument supporting codes of conduct and non-
governmental monitoring as a complement to public regulation, see O'Rourke, supra note 6, at
25. Others argue that corporate codes of conduct and monitoring potentially undermine
certain aspects of labor regulation. See, e.g., Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism
and the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 401 (Spring 2001).
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combines trade and factory monitoring to improve working conditions and
enforce core labor rights along the global supply chain. Second, I expound
on the purpose of the ILO and the way it approaches labor rights issues,
explaining how the ILO monitoring project in Cambodia is a novel and
important experiment for the UN organization. Finally, I use the ILO
program as a case study to explore how future monitoring programs ought
to be constructed and implemented to best improve labor conditions.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section II provides context
to the ILO project by describing the Cambodian garment sector, including
the working conditions and obstacles to labor law enforcement that existed
in Cambodia at the time of the signing of the Agreement. In Section III, I
describe the Agreement's provisions and the legal context within which it
was negotiated. Section IV, which constitutes the bulk of the paper,
describes and critiques the various ILO monitoring program proposals in
order to develop a set of criteria that ought to guide the design of such
programs in the future. Finally, I conclude that combining trade strategies
with ILO monitoring is a positive development in the effort to improve
factory working conditions worldwide. Accordingly, the ILO ought to
engage in more factory level monitoring programs that are transparent and
work to build independent and democratic trade unions.
II. THE CAMBODIAN GARMENT SECTOR
Cambodia's textile industry produces approximately 75% of the
country's exports and is at once the largest and fastest growing segment of
the Cambodian industrial sector. In 1998, textile exports to the U.S. alone
were valued at $308 million-an increase of 305% over the previous year.8
By 2001, garment exports totaled $1.1 billion, with US exports comprising
$650 million. In the first nine months of 2002 these figures rose by around
12% .9
Approximately 200 factories operate in Phnom Penh at any given
moment, employing some 200,000 workers by official count, over 85% of
whom are women. Typical of the garment sectors in many developing
countries, nearly all of the factories are owned and operated by non-
Cambodians, mostly hailing from Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, and other
Southeast Asian countries.10 These factory owners have few ties to
Cambodia, and a quick scan of any one owner's curriculum vitae will
usually indicate stints of several years in a large number of low-wage,
textile producing countries. These owners are nomads, moving from
country to country, seeking low-wage employment markets and other
mechanisms for producing at the lowest cost.
8 Press Release, United States Trade Representative (Jan. 21, 1999) (on file with author).
9 See Regina Abrami, Worker Rights and Global Trade: The U.S.-Cambodia Bilateral Textile
Trade Agreement, Harvard Business School Case Study, No. 9-703-034, at 16 (Aug. 2003).
10 Cambodian Ministry of Commerce, Trade Directory, at
http://www.moc.gov.kh/trade-directory/listgarme.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
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A. Labor Conditions in the Garment Industry
In order to understand the context in which the ILO program was
designed and implemented, it is important to consider the factory
conditions in the time period during which the program was created.
Despite a relatively strong labor code passed in 1996, which provided for
numerous worker protections,11 the actual working conditions in many
Cambodian garment factories were very poor. John Hall's excellent and
comprehensive 1998-1999 case study of Cambodian garment factories, from
which I will draw extensively in this section, identified numerous
violations of Cambodian labor law and international labor standards. 2 A
brief overview of his findings, combined with my own more limited
observations from the summer of 1999, will present a glimpse of the
challenges facing Cambodian garment workers in the workplace.
In order to obtain a garment factory job, Hall found that workers were
often required to pay fees of at least one month's wages to middlemen -in
contravention of international and Cambodian law. In return for these fees,
the middlemen would arrange for the job and transportation from the
countryside to Phnom Penh. These fees, however, often forced the workers'
rural-based families into debt, forcing workers to continue their
employment in order to pay off the debt in spite of the difficulties they
faced in the factories. 13
Long hours and forced overtime - often without overtime pay - were
another typical violation of Cambodian and international law found by
Hall.14 During my own time in Cambodia, many factory workers
complained of often being forced to work late into the night, and
sometimes workers were locked in the factories until a particular customer
order was completed. 15 In one instance, I spoke with several workers from
a Phnom Penh neighborhood who reported routinely working at a nearby
factory from seven a.m. to seven p.m., six days a week, and until four p.m.
on Sundays. 16 However, the interview was broken up prematurely when a
man, apparently from management, came over on his motorcycle and
asked myself and the workers what we were doing.
Another company, Hung Wah, hired by Nike to produce Nike apparel,
was infamous among workers and labor inspectors for its horrible working
11 See LABOR CODE (1997) (Cambodia),
at http://www.moc.gov.kh/laws-regulation/rkm-labor law 97.htm. In addition to the
Labor Code, the Cambodian Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, Vocational Training and Youth
Rehabilitation issues "Prakas", which are administrative orders and interpretations of the
Cambodian Code that have the force of law.
12 See generally John Hall, Note, Human Rights and the Garment Industry in Contemporary
Cambodia, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 119 (Winter 2000).
13 See id. at 152. While this does not explicitly violate any articles of the Cambodian Labor
Code, it arguably violates the Code's prohibition against forced labor as workers are
compelled to work in the factory to pay off their debts.
14 Id. at 160-61.
15 Id. at 160.
16 Interview with workers in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (July 1999).
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conditions. One worker I spoke with complained of pervasive illness
among the employees, which she and NGO workers claim was caused by
the long working hours and difficult living conditions endured by workers
on account of their low wages and substandard lodging. When workers
complained to management about not getting time off on Sundays, the
problem of long hours reportedly became worse.17 In an interview, the
head labor inspector also acknowledged severe problems at Hung Wah,
including lack of restrooms and forced overtime. However, disputing the
workers' account, he claimed that the problems were resolved after labor
inspector intervention, and said that no further action was necessary. 18
Wage violations were also common.19 Although the mandated
minimum wage was $40 for a forty-eight hour week, the workers I
interviewed often reported sub-minimum wages, late payment of wages,
and illegal wage deductions.
The right to freedom of association and the right to organize, as
guaranteed in the Cambodian Labor Code20 and under international law,21
were also routinely violated. Workers were harassed, fired, or transferred
to less desirable jobs for attempting to organize unions or speak out against
abuses. Workers and union representatives were also subject to
intimidation and physical abuse by the police and management during
labor disputes.-
Workers seeking to register independent unions not aligned with the
ruling party often faced large administrative hurdles in violation of Article
7 of ILO Convention 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize). 23 In a 1998 petition to the U.S. government requesting
that Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) privileges 24 not be extended
to Cambodia, the AFL-CIO documented a number of cases in which
independent labor unions were unable to register officially and obtain the
privileges that would follow, while politically connected unions had few
problems.25 One of the primary obstacles documented was the requirement
under Cambodian labor law that union officials provide certificates of no
criminal record and identification cards.26 Obtaining these documents is
17 Interview with Dy Pich, Garment Worker, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (June 1999).
18 Interview with Hout Chanty, Deputy Head Labor Inspector, in Phnom Penh,
Cambodia (June 25, 1999).
19 Hall, supra note 12, at 162-66.
20 See Labor Code Ch. XI (1997) (Cambodia) for details on the rights to freedom of
association and to organize. See also CAMBODIAN CONST. art. 36.
21 Hall, supra note 12, at 134-44.
22 See id. at 142.
23 See id. at 136-39 (citing International Labor Organization Convention No. 87, July 9,
1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17, art. 7).
24 The GSP is a law by which certain developing countries may receive special reductions
in tariffs provided they meet certain conditions. See 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (2000) et seq. For a history
of labor rights in the GSP system, see Compa & Vogt, supra note 3.
25 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR-CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, WORKERS'
RIGHTS AND THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (CAMBODIA): THE AFL- CIO PETITION
TO THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVES (June 16,1998).
26 Labor Code, art. 269 (Cambodia).
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difficult in Cambodia due to weak bureaucratic structures and entrenched
corruption. Thus, because it was almost impossible to fulfill the formal
requirements to register, political connections and bribery became the
default registration mechanism.27
Other problems included pervasive violations of health and safety
standards embodied in the Cambodian Labor Code, including inadequate
toilet facilities, inadequate medical care, and poor ventilation in factories.28
In the summer of 1999, for example, over two-dozen workers passed out in
a single day because of harmful fumes and poor ventilation in one factory.
At the hospital where they were taken, the hospital director stated that
many of them were suffering from exhaustion and low blood pressure,
perhaps caused by long working hours.29
B. Obstacles to Labor Law Enforcement30
While the Labor Code proscribes many of the conditions and actions
noted above, the law was seldom enforced. For example, despite many
instances of interference with union organizing by factory owners,
documented by the Cambodian Labor Organization (CLO) and other
groups,, the Deputy Chief Labor Inspector, Hout Chanty, told me that up
until the time of our meeting, no fines had been imposed for interfering
with union organizing.31
One reason for the lack of enforcement was the inadequacy of the labor
inspectorate. Perhaps more important than lack of technical knowledge
was that labor inspectors (like all state workers) were paid well below a
living wage.32 This means that inspectors, in order to make a living, were
forced to take bribes for under-reporting violations in order to supplement
their income.33
A second factor in the lack of enforcement was the connection between
the state and industry. The state had a political and financial interest in not
enforcing the Labor Code too stringently. As John Hall noted, conducting
business in Cambodia means maintaining ties with the ruling party.34 In
addition to providing generous financial support to the ruling Cambodian
People's Party (CPP) and to Prime Minister Hun Sen, the garment industry
27 Hall, supra note 12, at 139.
28 Id. at 154-58.
29 Khuy Sokhoean & Yko Maeda, Factory Fumes Fell Dozens, CAMBODIA DAILY, July 29,
1999, at 13.
30 Much of the information in this section is based on the author's observations while
researching this article in Cambodia, including numerous conversations with NGO workers
and union members.
31 Interview with Hout Chanty, Deputy Chief Labor Inspector, in Phnom Penh,
Cambodia, (June 25,1999).
32 Hall, supra note 12, at 126.
33 It is difficult to obtain the official records of fines imposed on companies. When I
requested such a list from a Cambodian official, I was told that it existed but that it would not
be distributed.
34 Hall, supra note 12, at 131-33.
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served both the financial and political interests of the party. In one
example, Sen promised garment factory jobs to a set of squatters in return
for their involvement in pro-CPP rallies. 35 To provide these jobs, Sen
needed the cooperation of factory owners.
It was also not uncommon for high-ranking members of the
government to have direct financial interests in garment enterprises,
although little direct involvement with operations. 36 What's more, because
Cambodian bureaucracy operated on something akin to a fee-for-service
basis (with the fees going into the pockets of bureaucrats and politicians),
government officials could personally benefit from business operations. 37
Whenever a permit or paperwork or any other service from the state was
required, factory owners would pay a fee to the necessary officials.38 These
political and financial relationships between government elites and
business have important consequences for the way in which programs to
improve labor standards are designed and implemented.
The existence of export quotas created yet another nexus between the
state and business. Because of the limit imposed on the number of
garments that could be exported, the government set up a system of
allocating the export quotas to companies. This quota system is
complicated, but the basic outline is as follows. The majority of the quotas
were to be allotted based on the export levels of the applicant company in
the previous year. Ten percent were based on a closed auction where
companies bid on the available quotas, and another ten percent were to be
"rewarded" to companies exporting "high value textiles.. .and/or
complying with the Cambodian Labor Code with respect to international
labor standards."39 In addition, any additional quota granted by the U.S.
(pursuant to the Agreement) was to be partially auctioned off and partially
rewarded to new businesses or existing businesses.40 The allocation system,
while serving as a means for the state to raise revenue from the quota
auctions,41 also created the potential for officials administering the auction
to get payoffs in return for granting the allocations. This was the clear
implication when, upon attempting to collect information on how the
"special" quotas were allocated, one factory owner told me that I "would
35 Id. at 133.
36 See id. at 131. In one instance, when I was tring to contact the owners of a factory from
which the independent union leaders had been fired, I was referred to a Cambodian army
general who I was informed was a co-owner.
37 See id. at 131-33.
38 This was commonly noted by local NGO workers. See also id. at 126.
39 Cambodian Ministry of Commerce, Pub. No. 360, Prakas: On the Result of Tender for
Quota on Garments to Be Exported to the United States, art. 4 (Feb. 1, 1999) (on file with
author).
40 See id.
41 Several million dollars were officially raised from the auctions alone. See Cambodian
Ministry of Commerce, Pub. No. 581, Prakas: On the Result of Tender for Quota on Garments
To Be Exported To the United States (Feb. 25, 1999); Cambodian Ministry of Commerce, Pub.
No. 793, Prakas: On the Result of Tender for Quota on Garments To Be Exported To the
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be advised not to inquire into that."42
The ruling CPP also derived political support from unions that were
essentially controlled by the party.43 Cambodia has several unions and
federations. 44 Most of these, however, are politically aligned and are what
have been termed "paper unions." 45 They do little in the interests of the
workers they purport to represent, but instead serve as vehicles for
mobilizing political support for one political faction or another. For
example, during the first consultation meeting between the U.S. and
Cambodia to discuss the criteria for the monitoring program, in July 1999,
Chuon Mom Thol, leader of the Cambodian Union Federation (CUF),
testified that the only major challenge facing workers in the garment
industry was the threat of job loss from the imposition of quotas.46 The
CUF has little grassroots legitimacy. Nevertheless, Chuon Mom Thol is
routinely presented by the government as the legitimate representative of
the labor movement in Cambodia and serves as vice-chair of the Labor
Advisory Committee.47
The Free Trade Union of the Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia
(FTUWKC) was the only union aligned with an opposition politician.48 At
the same time, it is one of, if not the most, dynamic and effective unions in
Cambodia.49 At one time it received a great deal of support from Sam
Rainsy, who was (and remains) a prominent opposition political figure in
Cambodia.50 The FTUWKC has achieved some notable successes in forcing
factory owners-and the ministry of labor-to respond to its members'
demands. For example, in the summer of 2000, the FTUWKC led a massive
strike of up to 20,000 garment workers protesting for a higher minimum
wage. The minimum wage was subsequently raised to forty-five dollars
per month.51
42 Interview with factory owner, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Aug. 3, 1999).
43 See Hall, supra note 12, at 145-50.
44 See generally International Labor Affairs Bureau, Foreign Labor Trends - Cambodia, at
http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/flt/cambodia-2003.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2004).
45 See Hall supra note 12, at 145.
46 Article 10 of the Agreement states that "[tihe Government of the United States and the
Royal Government of Cambodia shall conduct not less than two consultations during each
Agreement Year to discuss labor standards, specific benchmarks, and the implementation of
this program." See The Agreement, supra note 1. The author attended the first such meeting in
July 1999.
47 See generally International Labor Affairs Bureau, supra note 44.
48 Id.
49 Id. Sadly, the leader of the FTUWKC, Chea Vichea, was murdered on January 22, 2004,
in what many suggested was a politically motivated assassination. See, e.g., Cambodian Union
Boss Shot Dead, BBC NEWS WORLD EDMION, Jan. 22, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/3418821.stm.
50 According to John Hall, this support had become primarily legal and logistical rather
than financial. Hall, supra note 12, at 147. The union had attracted a great deal of foreign
support, including the provision of an international advisor who informed me that her
position was funded by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, a German development organization.
Interview with Katja Hemmerich, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (June 1999).
51 See Sarah Strickland, Cambodian Clothing Workers Take to Street Over Conditions,
INDEPENDENT (LONDON), June 23, 2000; Wayne Arnold, Translating Union Into Khmer, NEW
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There used to be only one exception to the politically aligned unions:
the National Independent Federation of Textile Unions in Cambodia (NIF-
TUC). NIF-TUC was a confederation of politically independent unions that
was initially supported by the Cambodian Labor Organization (CLO), a
Cambodian labor rights NGO. NIF-TUC's leadership, unlike its colleague
federations, was comprised wholly of garment workers. 52 Recently, a
breakaway union called the Coalition of Cambodia Apparel Workers
Democratic Unions (CCAWDU) has formed from NIF-TUC. Many now say
that CCAWDU has more legitimacy and independence than NIF-TUC,
which has come to suffer from credible accusations of corruption.53
III. THE TEXTILE TRADE AGREEMENT
It is in this context that the U.S./Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade
Agreement 54 was signed on January 20, 1999, and renewed in December
2001.55 The Agreement, valid for three years, provides for quotas on twelve
apparel product categories exported from Cambodia to the U.S.
A. Putting the Agreement into Context: A Brief Overview of the
Regulation of Textile Imports
Textiles have long received special treatment under international trade
law.56 Beginning in the 1950s, cotton textiles were accorded special
treatment due to the fears of developed countries, particularly those of the
US, about the impact on domestic manufacturers of low-cost textile
imports from Japan.5 7 Following on the heels of independently negotiated
agreements between various member and non-member countries,
contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
agreed that Article XIX (which provides measures to safeguard local
industries) would be significantly expanded for textiles. A series of similar
expansions were negotiated over the course of the next thirty years,
YORK TiMES; July 12, 2001, at CI.
52 The current leaders of NIF-TUC are Morm Nhim, President, and Ken Ken Chheng
Lang, both former factory workers. The Cambodian Labor Organization (CLO) initially
supported the creation of NIF-TUC. CLO's approach to union building was to create
grassroots democratic structures where workers would become leaders of their unions. While
in Cambodia in 1999 1 worked closely with CLO on a number of issues, including the creation
of NIF-TUC.
53 International Labor Affairs Bureau, supra note 44.
54 The Agreement, supra note 1.
55 The U.S. Congress has delegated to the President under 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (2003) the
power to negotiate agreements with foreign countries and to place quotas on textile and
garment exports from those countries to the U.S.
56 For a review of the history of the regulation of textiles in international trade law, see
generally Kitty G. Dickerson, Textile Trade: The GATT Exception, 11 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMM. 393,
404 (1996); ELLEN ROSEN, MAKING SWEATSHOPS: THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE U.S. APPAREL
INDUSTRY (2002).
57 See ROSEN, supra note 56, at 37- 43.
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culminating in the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) in 1974.58 The MFA
permitted importing countries to place quotas on textile imports when
surges in imports of particular products threatened domestic industry. This
contradicted basic GATT principles that place a preference on customs
tariffs over quotas5 9 and that require all countries to treat their trading
partners equally.60 The final MFA extension, in 1991-1993, specifically
permitted importing countries to punish exporting countries that engaged
in trans-shipment by imposing quotas, an action which, as noted, would
normally be forbidden under GATT.61
During the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations concluded in 1995,
the contracting parties concluded the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
(ATC).62 Under the ATC, the WTO contracting parties agreed to gradually
phase out the MFA over the course of ten years and bring textiles back
under traditional GATT rules.63 Currently, Cambodia is neither a member
of the WTO nor party to the MFA, and until it becomes such, these rules do
not bind the provisions in its trade agreements. But should it, as planned,
become a member of the WTO in 2005, quotas would have to be phased out
in accordance with WTO rules and only tariffs would remain.
In addition, Cambodia agreed to lower its trade tariffs and barriers to
U.S. textile exports. 64 If Cambodia becomes a member of the WTO in 2005,
and assuming the Agreement is renewed for the period until then, the
Agreement's provisions may be amended to comply with WTO
requirements. However, the U.S. explicitly provided in Article 19 of the
Agreement that the provision prescribing labor standards will remain in
force and will be referred to the Textile Monitoring Body of the WTO
should Cambodia become a member before 2005, at which date the ATC
lapses and quotas end.65
58 Agreement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (Multifibre Agreement), Dec. 20,
1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001 (entered into force on Apr. 1, 1974).
59 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30 1947, art. XI, 55 U.N.T.S. 188
(entered into force on Jan. 12,1948).
60 See id. art. 1.
61 See Dickerson, supra note 55, at 421 n. 153. Transshipment is a technique by which
exporters can get around the quotas placed on the country of production. Exporters ship the
garments through another country that has unused quotas, or no quotas at all, in order to
conceal the identity of the country of origin. This was the situation in Cambodia-other
countries were using Cambodia as a transshipment point because Cambodia was not subject
to U.S. quotas.
62 See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1995), 1868 U.N.T.S. 14, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/16-
tex e.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2003).
63 See id. art. 1.
64 Id. art. 20.
65 Article 19 of the Agreement reads:
In the event that Cambodia becomes a member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and the United States applies the Agreement
Establishing the WTO (WTO agreement) to Cambodia, the provisions set
out in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 20 will be
necessary in relationship to the implementation of Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing. Therefore, upon membership of Cambodia in the WTO and
application of the WTO agreement by the United States to Cambodia,
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A labor standards provision was included in the Agreement. This
was the first time such a provision had been included in a bilateral,
U.S.-negotiated trade agreement. This labor standards provision
represented a strategy by the Clinton administration to link trade with
labor and environmental standards. 66 American labor unions,
particularly the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile
Employees (UNITE), played a major role in advocating for linkage in
the Cambodia agreement, with NGOs such as the International Labor
Rights Fund and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights playing
supportive roles as well. The labor standards provision reads:
Cambodia shall support the implementation of a program
to improve the working conditions in the textile and
apparel sector, including internationally recognized core
labor standards, through the application of Cambodian
labor law .. .The Government of the United States will
make a determination... whether working conditions in
the Cambodia textile and apparel sector substantially
comply with such labor law and standards.67
If the U.S. determined that the Cambodian garment industry were in
substantial compliance with Cambodian labor law and internationally
recognized labor standards, the U.S. could, on a discretionary basis,
increase Cambodia's quotas up to fourteen percent per year in addition to a
standard six percent annual increase.68 This created a "carrot," in that if the
Cambodian garment industry were in substantial compliance, it would be
rewarded with a higher quota. In December 2001, the agreement was
renewed for another three years, and the quota incentive was increased to
up to eighteen percent.69 In 2000, the first year of the Agreement's
implementation, the U.S. government granted a five percent increase.70 In
2003, the U.S. government granted a twelve percent increase out of the
possible eighteen percent.7'
IV. THE PROPOSALS
The U.S. and Cambodian governments agreed that the ILO would
those provisions will remain in force and will be notified to the Textile
Monitoring Body.
66 Telephone Interview with Ray Unger, International Trade Specialist, U.S. Department
of Commerce (Dec. 20, 1999).
67 The Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10.
68 Id. However, when Cambodia becomes a member of the WTO and quotas are phased
out, the U.S. will likely have to alter the mechanism by which its labor provisions are
enforced. Textiles are not covered under GSP protections, thus the US would have either to
extend GSP to cover textiles, or to replace quotas with tariffs as the mechanism of enforcement
for this particular labor provision.
69 See Abrami, supra note 9, at 15.
70 Id. at 10.
71 Id. at 15. For a political and historical narrative of how the agreement came into being,
as well as the factors that went into some of the initial quota determinations, see id.
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design and implement the program required by the Agreement. 72 The cost
of the program was budgeted at $2.2 million: $200,000 was to come from
the Cambodian government, an equal amount from the Garment
Manufacturers Association of Cambodia (GMAC), and the remaining $1.8
million from the U.S. government. On June 9, 1999 the ILO circulated its
first draft proposal. This proposal included the input of the United States
Trade Representative, the Department of Labor, the Department of State,
the AFL-CIO, and UNITE.
No Cambodian NGOs or trade unions, however, were consulted
during the drafting process. Indeed, Cambodian groups had almost no
knowledge of the terms of the proposal before, during or after the
negotiations, and were not asked to contribute. One American official told
me at the time that he was concerned about getting too many groups "up
in arms" over it.
A total of six project proposals and counter proposals were circulated
between June 1999 and May 2000, when the final project document was
agreed upon. Although the Cambodian government and GMAC were
involved in the process and represented through the ILO's proposal, the
two primary negotiating parties were the U.S. government and the ILO. In
the next section, I analyze the initial ILO proposal, the U.S. counter-
proposal, and the final, agreed-upon proposal. The first two proposals
indicate how the ILO and U.S., respectively, would have preferred to shape
the program if left to their own devices. The ILO initially emphasized
capacity building in the Cambodian labor inspectorate, while the U.S.
proposal emphasized the need for an independent monitoring body run by
the ILO. The final joint proposal, which became the ILO program's
mandate, will be the subject of the last section of analysis.
A. ILO Proposal: Labor Law Implementation in the Textile and
Apparel Industry of Cambodia
The initial ILO proposal was entitled "Labor Law Implementation in
the Textile and Apparel Industry of Cambodia."73 The proposal's problem
72 UNITE had lobbied for a different monitoring mechanism, designed by Professor Mark
Barenberg, a leading expert on international labor regulation at Columbia University Law
School. Under this plan, a Labor Supervisory Commission would be established, composed
equally of Cambodian government officials, independent Cambodian labor rights experts, and
ILO representatives. The Commission would have functioned as something akin to a "shadow
labor ministry," and would have engaged in a number of government-like activities including
supervising elections of worker representatives, designing regulations governing union
recognition, and conducting unannounced investigations of factories. It would also have had
remedial powers, such as the exclusive authority to implement the functions of dispute
resolution and mediation as provided for in the law. See Memorandum on Proposals for
Bilateral Trade Agreement by/from UNITE (Nov. 19, 1998) (on file with author). The U.S.
government rejected this proposal, however, because it felt that it would unacceptably
infringe upon the sovereignty of the Cambodian government. Interview with Mark
Barenberg, Columbia University Law School, in New York, NY (Nov. 2002).
73 Labor Law Implementation in the Textile and Apparel Industry of Cambodia , ILO
June 9, 1999) (draft not publicly circulated, on file with author) [hereinafter Proposal I].
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statement declared that the project's key objective was "to ensure that a
system of monitoring exists that is adequate to enable 'substantial
compliance' with Cambodia's labor legislation to be verified on a regular
and on-going basis."74 The proposal asserted that enabling compliance
with the labor code in a sustainable way required "strengthening capacity
for self-compliance with laws and regulations." 75 This was to be achieved
through improving relations between workers and management by
building up workplace mechanisms that fostered "closer cooperation in
preventing disputes, settling quickly and fairly those disputes that do arise,
and generally contributing to the development of an industrial relations
system that encourages harmony and cooperation rather than
confrontation and conflict." 76
The proposal identified certain problems that would have to be
addressed to bring about substantial compliance. 77 Generally, the
highlighted problems were not violations of core labor rights as defined in
the ILO's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,78
such as anti-union discrimination and violations of freedom of association,
but rather violations of labor standards such as underpayment of wages,
poor health and safety provisions, lack of internal work rules and
procedures within individual enterprises, and lack of enforcement of
internal mechanisms for conflict resolution, such as free and fair elections
of shop stewards. 79 Although the proposal noted the "lack of, or weak
organizations at enterprise level," as well as "general disregard by
companies of workers' rights, "notably the word "union" was never used
in the proposal.80
Furthermore, in a section describing problems that existed in the
government inspection system, the proposal described a number of
technical deficiencies in the inspection process without ever mentioning
the fundamental problems that prevented effective inspections: corruption
by inspectors and the close relationship between the government and





78 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86th Session, Geneva,
June 1998.
79 Proposal I, supra note 58, 32-34. For a discussion of labor rights versus labor
standards, see Gary S. Fields, The Role of Labor Standards in U.S. Trade Policies (Paper prepared
for the Conference on Social Dimensions of U.S. Trade Policies, Washington D.C April 16-17).
Fields calls process oriented standards labor rights, which he defines as "human rights in the
workplace." See id. at 15. These rights are so fundamental, he argues, that it would better to
have no production at all than production using such illegitimate means. I would equate these
rights with the core labor rights defined in the ILO's Declaration on Fundamental Principles.
See supra note 79. Labor standards, on the other hand, are those workplace processes and
conditions that, according to Fields, "we would aim towards and rather have than not have."
Fields, at 15-16. I believe that a system in which labor rights are adequately protected is the
best means of arriving at an optimal level of labor standards.
80 Proposal I, supra note 72, 33.
81 See id. 34.
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project strategy never envisioned ILO monitoring, but rather building the
capacity of the Cambodian labor inspectorate to monitor and enforce
Cambodian labor law through training of government inspectors.82
The proposal set forth a somewhat incoherent set of strategies intended
to address "the problems facing the [Ministry of Labor] and the social
partners."8 3 The proposal made the Tripartite Compliance Committee
(TCC) the administrative and advisory focal point of the certification
process. It would consist of twelve members: "3 government, 3 workers
from separate labor federations/unions, 3 employers, and 3 independent
persons," as selected by the Project Advisory Committee.84
The core of the strategy would be to strengthen the Cambodian labor
inspection system.85 The ILO explicitly excluded itself from undertaking
monitoring on its own and "did not envisage the ILO as a law enforcement
agency or as an agent to directly monitor compliance with the articles of
the USA-Cambodia Trade Agreement."8 6 Instead, "[t]he ILO's role [was] to
monitor and advise on the implementation of a technical cooperation
project, not to undertake inspections in its own name in individual
enterprises."87 No monitoring program independent of the government
labor inspectorate was to be created. As we shall see, what became reality
was far afield of this initial vision.
As envisaged, the inspection process would have been as follows. The
labor inspection teams would be comprised of Cambodian inspectors
working directly for the government. The ILO would act primarily as a
technical advisor to the Ministry of Labor and to these inspection teams.88
The teams would submit inspection reports evaluating levels of compliance
according to a set of core indicators endorsed by the tripartite committee.
8 9
These core indicators would be based on what is required of factories by
the Cambodian Labor Code (i.e., not necessarily internationally recognized
core labor standards).90 Although certain indicators were recommended in
the proposal, they tended to focus on industrial relations-type criteria, such
as the presence of "manager worker discussion forums" (which are not
mandated by the Labor Code), rather than on respect for core labor rights.91
In a section recommending indicators that would be necessary given the
labor code, there is little reference to unions or labor rights apart from the
protection of union officials from retaliatory firings.
92
To ensure effective compliance with Cambodian labor law, a system of
certificates of compliance would be established in which companies
82 See id. 38.
83 Id. 35.
84 Id. 45.
85 Proposal I, supra note 75, 35(a)(i), 38.
86 Id. 38.
87 Id.
88 See id. 39.
89 Id. 40.
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deemed to be "substantially complying" would be granted certificates. 93
These certificates would enable factories to obtain quota allocations for
export of their garments to the U.S.94
The process of issuing certificates of compliance would have been as
follows. The findings in the inspection report would be shared with
representatives of workers and management. If the problems noted in the
reports could not be informally resolved between the parties, the report
would be forwarded to the director of labor inspection who would make a
recommendation to the Minster of Labor, the ILO and the TCC as to
whether or not a certificate of compliance ought to be issued to the
factory.95 Without a certificate, a company would not be able to acquire
additional quotas for shipment of garments to the U.S. Initially, certificates
would be valid for three months.9 6 No certificate could be issued without
being submitted to the TCC for discussion and comment, and the TCC
would conduct public hearings by inviting the public to comment in open
hearings.97 The Minster of Labor, however, and not the TCC would make
the final determination. As the document makes clear, "the [TCC] will have
no executive powers and will operate [only] as an advisory body."98
The process proposed, including enabling public comment on factories,
could have presented a powerful experiment in transparency. First,
enabling outside observers and directly affected parties such as workers
and unions to comment might have provided an incentive for factories to
clean up their practices or be exposed in a public forum. Second, it could
have provided workers with an organizing opportunity. By granting
unions and their members, as well as other groups, an opportunity to
impact the ability of a company to obtain a compliance certificate, a point
of leverage might have been created around which workers could mobilize
to put pressure on factories to respect Cambodian labor law.
1. Critique
i. U.S. Determination of Quota Increase: Definition of Substantial
Compliance
The Agreement requires that a determination be made by the U.S.
government, for the purposes of quota allocation, whether Cambodia's
garment sector is in substantial compliance with the Cambodian labor code
and international labor standards. Although "substantial compliance" is
referred to throughout the proposal, there is no definition of what
industry-wide "substantial compliance" means.99 The failure to define
93 Id. 36.
94 See id. 43.
95 Proposal I, supra note 72, 42.
96 See id. 44.
97 See id. 43.
98 Id. 46.
99 See the Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10 (d).
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substantial compliance may leave too much room for politically based and
subjective decision-making by the U.S. This is a critique of both the way the
Agreement was written, and the way in which the project proposal was
written. These two documents ought to be read together organically such
that the implementation of the program would reduce the discretionary
nature of the determination with respect to quota allocation made by the
U.S. government.
ii. Certification Process
While the certificate system might have created powerful incentives for
individual factories to improve compliance, there were problems in the
way the system was designed.
a. Substantial Compliance
There were insufficient objective criteria by which to determine
whether specific factories were in substantial compliance for the purpose of
issuing compliance certificates. 100 Compliance certificates were to be
granted based on a set of indicators that would be developed by the TCC
and approved by the Ministry of Labor. However, the project proposal
provided little basis for guiding the relevant actors on how these indicators
would be used to determine if factories were or were not in substantial
compliance.
b. International Core Labor Rights
The proposal also failed to require sufficient reflection of core
international labor rights in the indicators that were to be used to
determine if the factories were substantially compliant. According to the
proposal, the legal source of the core indicators would be the Cambodian
Labor Code. 10 1 The Agreement, however, specifically called for the
indicators to be drawn from both the Code and internationally recognized
100 It should be noted that some critics have generally questioned the value and reliability
of factory certification systems. First, certification systems might give incorrect information
about the current state of affairs in a factory. Some contemporary systems, such as Worldwide
Responsible Apparel Program (WRAP), are based on a certification process that takes place
once a year, and eventually twice a year. See http://www.wrapapparel.org/ (last visited Dec.
11, 2003). Because workplace conditions can be extremely dynamic and quick to change, these
snapshots might not accurately reflect the state of labor rights compliance in the factory.
Second, some trade unionists suggest that any form of certification is misleading because a
factory is never completely compliant. Winning respect of labor rights is an ongoing struggle
between workers and management. Third, some argue certification is inherently impossible
because of the intangibles inherent in labor rights monitoring. Evaluating compliance with
freedom of association, for example, is an inherently qualitative process that seldom lends
itself to compliant/non-compliant determinations. Accordingly, determining that a factory is
compliant is inherently impossible.
101 See Proposal I, supra note 72, 41.
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labor standards.102 The rationale was to ensure that if there were any
deficiencies in labor rights protections under the Labor Code, this gap
would be filled by reference to internationally recognized core labor
standards.103 Thus, the proposal, like the Agreement, should have required
that the indicators reflect core international standards.
c. Government Control of the Certification Process
Another problem was that the certification process would essentially
be controlled by the government. We have already seen that the
Cambodian government was closely aligned with business interests.
Although the creation of an ostensibly representative committee is a step
towards greater transparency and accountability, the TCC had no real
power; and, in the end, it would still have been the government making
case by case decisions with little accountability.
d. TCC Prone to Bias
Finally, the TCC was prone to bias. The government and the GMAC
would have made up half the body, there was no requirement that the
workers' representatives come from independent or democratic unions,
and there were few criteria relating to the identity of the independent
observers. Genuine workers organizations could very well have had little
or no representation at all because of their small numbers compared with
the proliferation of government union federations.
iii. Emphasis on Capacity Building
The focus on capacity building and technical assistance and the lack of
ILO-conducted monitoring would have been problematic. One of the core
problems with Cambodia's monitoring system was the degree of
corruption within the inspectorate. Making the ILO only a technical
advisor would not have addressed this fundamental problem because an
inspector who does not make a living wage cannot be trained to refuse
bribes.10 4 On the other hand, technical capacity building is a vital element
in implementing any ILO monitoring system because long-term
sustainability requires a functioning state regulatory system. However,
where that is impractical in the short-term, ILO monitoring can provide an
important intermediate step in that process.
In the end, the U.S rejected this proposal for many of the reasons cited
102 The Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10 (d).
103 It should be noted that at the time of the first proposal, Cambodia had adopted only
one of the ILO's core conventions. While the proposal indicated that the others would soon be
ratified by Cambodia's National Assembly, it implied that without ratification the industry
and government could not be held accountable under the conventions even though the
Agreement indicated otherwise.
104 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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above. The U.S. government took a more involved role in rewriting the
agreement and assigned the Department of Labor to make significant
alterations to the initial draft proposal with significant input from the AFL-
CIO and UNITE, the U.S. textile and apparel workers union. A new draft
was circulated (once again, secretly) on September 16, 1999.
B. Proposal II
Whereas Proposal I aimed to enable substantial compliance with the
Cambodian labor code, the objective of Proposal II shifted to implementing
.a system of monitoring that enables the United States accurately to
determine whether the Cambodian Government and Cambodian
employers ... are substantially complying with Cambodian labor law and
internationally recognized core labor standards." 105 The Proposal I goal of
improving industrial relations was completely eliminated. 106
By contrast with Proposal I's identification of the primary objectives as
improving labor standards and industrial relations, Proposal II clearly
stated that the primary problem to be addressed was the violation of labor
rights in the factories. Accordingly, the indicators to be used in
determining whether or not a factory was in substantial compliance with
Cambodian labor law and international core standards explicitly
highlighted labor rights such as freedom of association; whether or not the
factory engages in good faith bargaining; the right to strike; and if unions
are recognized by the employer in accordance with the law.10 7 The drafters
took pains to emphasize that the indicators would be based not only on
Cambodian labor law, but also internationally recognized core labor
standards.
Proposal II also substantially changed the role of the ILO. Rather than
acting primarily as a technical advisor, it was to begin operating as an
independent monitoring body. Teams of ILO inspectors would visit
individual factories, make initial assessments of compliance levels with the
core indicators, and then make substantial compliance plans for each
individual factory.
An innovative protocol required the ILO monitoring teams to respond
to complaints by workers alleging anti-union discrimination. The
monitoring teams would visit factories:
on each occasion when employees complain that the
enterprise has interfered with union activity or engaged in
anti-union retaliation, in order to monitor and report on
[violations of freedom of association]; on each occasion
when employees complain that the enterprise has
105 Labor Law Implementation in the Textile and Apparel Industry of Cambodia, at 27,
ILO (Sept. 16, 1999) (draft proposal not publicly circulated, on file with author) [hereinafter
Proposal II].
106 Id. 25.
107 See id. 41 (1-4).
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manipulated . . . the independent activity of any labor
organization... ; on each occasion when a union or union
supporters present their demands for recognition, or the
enterprise or Cambodian government makes inquiries or
determination about the representative status of unions..
.; periodically during each collective strike or protest.108
The monitoring teams would write reports on their findings after a
factory visit (whether it was routine or requested) and then present them to
management and workers, who would then try to resolve the issues in a
forum with the inspection team acting as mediator. If there were no
agreement, the differences would be noted in the public document.
Regardless of negotiated outcomes between workers and management, this
document would then be forwarded to a monitoring body called the
Tripartite Compliance Committee (now called the Tripartite Advisory
Committee (TAC)). 109
The TAC would be comprised of two government representatives,
three employer representatives, three union representatives, and four
public interest representatives chosen by the ILO's Chief Technical
Advisor. This would mean that the independent participants would have a
dominant role. Advice on the appointment of the TAC would be given by a
proposed Project Advisory Committee (PAC) composed of the parties to
the agreement and the ILO.110 The PAC's responsibilities would also be
advisory, and would provide advice on such matters as project work plans
and implementation."'
The TAC would hold public hearings and provide for comment on the
reports. Whether all information in the reports would be released and
made public was not completely clear. The Chief Technical Advisor would
also submit reports on a quarterly basis to the Project Advisory Committee
that would assess the level of substantial compliance with the law and with
ILO standards.11 2 Whether this meant an assessment of specific factories, or
of overall industry-wide substantial compliance was also not clear. The
reports from the monitoring teams and the overall quarterly assessment
from the Chief Technical Advisor would then be used by the U.S. in its
determinations under the Agreement, and could be used by the Cambodian
Government in its quota allocation decisions.1 3
The final major difference between Proposal I and Proposal II
alteration concerned the compliance certification process-in Proposal II it
was completely eliminated. In fact, there would be no company-specific
financial incentives to encourage compliance, or punish non-compliance.
108 Id.
109 Id. 43.
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1. Critique
The elimination of the certificate of compliance system meant that
there might be insufficient incentives to compel individual companies to
comply with the requirements of the Agreement. Without the company-
specific instrument of the certificates, there would be only collective
incentives for the industry as a whole. This might create a free-rider
problem. Individual companies might make a rational decision not to
comply with the Labor Code (assuming compliance raises costs or has
other perceived or real disadvantages) if they believed that the other
companies in the industry would comply sufficiently for the US to grant
the industry-wide quota. So long as a company could be confident that it
would acquire quota regardless of its individual conduct, it would have
little reason to bring its own conduct into compliance.11 4 Given the suspect
nature of the quota allocation system, this would have been a likely
scenario.115
An alternative mechanism to deal with this might have been to link
individual factory level compliance with individual quota allocation.
Because it is likely that very few factories would have been found to be in
substantial compliance, a mechanism that allowed for levels of progress
might have been developed. An obvious difficulty with this, of course, is
the development of a set of metrics that could evaluate the level of
compliance in a quantitative way.11 6 The central point is that in situations
where quotas or other forms of incentives are used, there should be some
link between individual performance and reward.
Like Proposal I, Proposal II lacked a definition of "substantial
compliance." Thus, the U.S. would have remained free to make decisions
unbounded by formal criteria.
Proposal II also lacked mechanisms to address the problem of
discrimination in the trade union registration process. While one of the
core indicators asks if there has been company intervention in the process
of union recognition, there is no reference to government interference. Yet,
as we have seen, government bureaucratic obstacles were pervasive in the
process of independent unions seeking recognition.
Finally (and this applies to both proposals), protection of workers'
rights also requires permitting workers to be involved in the process of
creating and drafting the mechanisms which are supposedly to their
benefit. There was close to no outreach to Cambodian workers' groups
during the crafting of these proposals. Indeed, during the first consultation
meeting between the U.S. and Cambodia to discuss the labor standards
114 There are, however, collective pressures that might be exerted by the Manufacturers
Association on its members to comply. But this assumes that the association would on its own
be able to monitor and police its membership adequately.
115 See Hall, supra note 12, at 131-33.
116 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (formerly LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS),
YARDSTICKS FOR WORKERS' RIGHTS: LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE, at
http://workersrights.humanrightsfirst.org/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
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provision, CLO, NGO's, and the FTWUKC were only formally notified of
the meeting two days beforehand." 7 Politically connected unions such as
the CUF were given a great deal of notice, and thus had the opportunity to
craft better speeches for the benefit of the foreign audience.
C. The Final Project Document -Proposal VI: Ensuring that Working
Conditions in the Textile and Apparel Sector of Cambodia Comply
with Internationally Recognized Core Labor Standards and the
Cambodian Labor Law
What emerged in the final agreed upon draft was a program that
borrowed from the initial ILO approach as expressed in the June 1999
proposal, as well as the US Department of Labor's approach as expressed
in the September 1999 proposal.
The agreed upon problem statement reads: "The key issue to be
addressed ... is to ensure that working conditions in Cambodia's textile
and apparel sector comply with internationally recognized core labor
standards and the Cambodian Labor Code."" 8 Compare this with the ILO's
initial proposal which indicated the key issue to be addressed as
"ensur[ing] that a system of monitoring exists that is adequate to enable
'substantial compliance' with Cambodia's labor legislation to be verified on
a regular and on-going basis."" 9 Compare this also with the U.S.
government's initial proposed problem statement, which held that the
primary goal of the plan was to enable "the United States accurately to
determine whether the Cambodian Government and Cambodian
employers in the apparel and textile sector are substantially complying
with Cambodian labor law and internationally recognized core labor
standards." 120 The first proposal was oriented towards building the
monitoring capacity of government labor ministry in order to improve
working conditions. The second was oriented to enabling the U.S. to make
a determination on substantial compliance. The final document's primary
concern is to ensure that working conditions in the factories comply with
Cambodian and international standards.
The means of ensuring that working conditions comply with
Cambodian and international law is essentially two-pronged. First and
most significantly, an independent external monitoring program will be
run by the ILO.121 Second, capacity building and technical assistance will
be provided by the ILO through training a core group of Cambodian labor
117 Statement of Cambodian Labor Organization at First Consultation Meeting (on file
with author).
118 Ensuring that Working Conditions in the Textile and Apparel Sector of Cambodia
Comply with Internationally Recognized Core Labor Stands and the Cambodian Labor Law,
at 26, ILO (May 4, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Proposal VII.
119 Proposal I, supra note 75, 27.
120 Proposal II, supra note 106, 27.
121 Proposal VI, supra note 119, 32.
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inspectors.122 This capacity building is to be the ILO's means of ensuring
that the program addresses and facilitates enforcement issues. The ILO will
also provide technical assistance in drafting regulations and labor laws.
The inclusion of both of these elements represents a compromise from the
initial proposals, since the first ILO proposal focused only on capacity
building and the second U.S. proposal focused only on monitoring.
It is also interesting to note how the terms of reference for the program
developed. In the first proposal, the terms were to be strictly based on the
Cambodian Labor Code. The second proposal by the U.S. focused on the
Labor Code and core worker rights as reflected in the ILO core
conventions. The agreed upon plan shares the Proposal II approach: the
legal standard to be used is a combination of Cambodian labor law and
internationally recognized workers' rights. 23
1. Monitoring Methodology
The methodology of the monitoring is the crux of the agreement, and it
is worth giving it some attention. A good deal of discretion is placed in the
hands of the ILO's Chief Technical Advisor to operate the program as he
sees fit. However, some general methodology is provided for in the
monitoring plan.
Four teams of two monitors will each inspect participating Cambodian
apparel factories. The stated goal is that each factory would be monitored
on average six times per year.124 Once the monitoring reports are finalized
with the approval of the Chief Technical Advisor, the inspectors are to
discuss the findings with employers and the workers. 25 If there is
disagreement as to the findings they are to be resolved in the discussions. If
this fails, the disagreements are to be noted in the final factory reports.
i. Indicators
The section governing indicators was one of the most contentious of
the negotiations, and provides some of the more interesting insights into
the different strategic approaches of the ILO and US Department of Labor.
First, in the final project document it was agreed that the indicators would
be developed by the Chief Technical Advisor. However, it is made clear
that these indicators would at least include the basic worker rights as well
as "other working conditions," such as wages and hours, and health and
safety issues.126 The purpose of these indicators is to provide a "checklist"
that monitors would use to evaluate labor rights compliance in the
factories. Moreover, the final document emphasizes that the indicators
should "focus on the process of workers exercising these rights at the
122 Id. 31.
123 Id. 25.
124 Id. app. 1, 2.7.
125 Id. app. 1, 2.8.
126 Proposal VI, supra note 119, app. 1, 2.4.
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workplace." 127 The checklist that was eventually developed by the Chief
Technical Advisor consists of 156 items that are to be monitored by the
ILO. It closely tracks the Cambodian Labor Code, categorizing the issues to
be monitored under the matching article of the code. The Labor Code is an
extremely detailed and comprehensive document, regulating many aspects
of industrial relations and factory conditions. The checklist, therefore,
covers everything from freedom of association to reporting on whether or
not there are daycare centers for workers' children. The effect is to give far
more attention to standards than to rights because of the breadth of the
Code.128
ii. Compliance Mechanism
Much of the debate about what indicators should be used in the factory
monitoring reflects different conceptions about the role of the monitoring
program. The U.S. Department of Labor's approach in Proposal II, clearly
reflecting UNITE's view,129 was that one of the important purposes of the
program was to facilitate the creation and organization of independent
unions. The requirement found in Proposal II that the ILO respond to
worker complaints was intended to place special emphasis on the rights of
workers to organize. This, it was believed, would be a crucial step towards
building up a labor movement in Cambodia that, in turn, would lead to
sustainable improved labor conditions.130
One of the most controversial paragraphs, and the subject of much
negotiation, relates to how responsive the monitors must be to workers'
complaints about employer interference with trade union activity. The
Department of Labor proposal envisioned a monitoring program that was
very responsive to such complaints and required the ILO to monitor and
report on claims of interference with trade union formation. The final
agreement's language requires that the ILO monitor trade union elections
and collective bargaining sessions, but only requires that they "give
particular consideration" to worker complaints regarding interference with
trade union activity.131 In other words, it is now discretionary rather than
mandatory that the ILO respond.
iii. Reporting and Transparency
Every three months, the Chief Technical Advisor is to publish
127 Id. at app. 1, 2.5.
128 See supra note 80 for a discussion of the difference between labor standards and labor
rights.
129 See Memorandum from United Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees to
United States Department of Labor 1 (Aug. 4, 1999) (on file with author).
130 Indeed, the AFL-CIO was hoping for as strong a mechanism as possible to protect
union organizing, for soon after the establishment of the ILO program, it established an office
of its Solidarity Center in Phnom Penh, staffing it with an experienced American union
organizer.
131 See Proposal VI, supra note 119, app. 1, 2.5.
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"synthesis reports." According to the project document, these reports are to
contain: 1) the names of the participating enterprises; 2) monitoring results
including the number of sites and the "results and shortcomings, if any";
and 3) "other information available to the [Chief Technical Advisor]."1 32
These reports and comments on the reports made by the PAC are to be
disseminated widely and placed on the ILO website. As of this writing,
eight reports have been made public, and two more will be made so
shortly.133
2. Critique
The problem with compromises is that often the most interesting
innovations are eliminated and the less desirable ones remain. The final
proposal did not introduce any new mechanisms, but instead pared down,
modified, or eliminated those that were proposed in the first two
documents. Because I have discussed these already, a brief account will
suffice. First, without a certificate of compliance system or other
mechanisms that focus on individual compliance, there are insufficient
mechanisms to compel compliance by individual factories. Second, there is
still no definition of substantial compliance. Currently, the Committee for
the Implementation of Textile Agreements makes the determination. 34
Third, without the aggressive monitoring protocols with respect to
complaints regarding trade union rights violations, provided for in
Proposal II, there are insufficient mechanisms to monitor such claims.
Finally, the method of quota allocation was not addressed.
In addition to the critiques already noted, another set of issues arise
based not only on the structure of the agreement, but also on its
implementation, as evidenced by observations during visits in December
2002 and April 2003.
i. No Participation Requirements
Without a certificate of compliance system, there must be another
mechanism to compel participation in the monitoring program, if not
compliance with the law. There was nothing included in the agreement to
require this. However, the Ministry of Commerce did pass an
administrative order that all factories, in order to receive export licenses,
had to participate in the otherwise voluntary ILO program.
132 Id. app. 1, 3.
133 See ILO, EIGHTH SYNTHESIS REPORT ON THE WORKING CONDITIONS SITUATION IN
CAMBODIA'S GARMENT SECTOR, at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia8.htm (last visited
April 18,2004).
134 The committee is comprised of the U.S. Departments of State, Labor, Commerce,
Treasury, and the United States Trade Representative. The proceedings of this committee are
not generally made public.
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ii. Factory Information Not Shared Equally
The project document requires that "once the [Chief Technical
Advisor] has approved the report the monitors will discuss it with the
employer and workers in an attempt to conciliate and reach agreement."
135
However, the project's Chief Technical Advisor, Lejo Sibbel, made a
decision at the beginning of the project that he would not share the results
of the factory monitoring with workers and their representatives because of
fears that the workers would use it to justify a strike. If the workers were to
go on strike in the beginning due to reports, he argued, this would
jeopardize the program. This decision was controversial, drawing criticism
from unions and workers' rights groups. A number of groups claimed that
they would like to be able to see the reports. 136 According to Sibbel, he has
begun to share the results of the reports with workers, but still does not
share the entire reports with workers. 37
This request of the unions has merit. First, it is unlikely that workers
will go on strike because of what is contained in a monitoring report.
Generally, workers are fully aware of problems in a factory and will go on
strike because other recourse to remedy them has failed. Moreover, if one
accepts the premise that improvement of working conditions is best
achieved with the participation of workers, then the active participation of
workers and unions in the monitoring process is crucial. There are several
reasons why full transparency ought to be encouraged. First, if workers'
health is in danger and the monitors uncover this, workers ought to have
access to that information. Second, workers who have the full information
in the report can make suggestions as to how certain problems might be
remedied. Finally, workers and unions who have access to the full factory
reports will be able to utilize it to mobilize workers and to negotiate with
employers. Workers and their representatives ought to be allowed to
comment on the findings of the report and have those comments
incorporated into the body of the final report.
iii. Insufficiently Responsive to Worker Complaints
Another issue noted by a number of interviewees was a lack of
responsiveness by the ILO to the complaints of workers. Proposal II
provided that the ILO was to respond to and monitor complaints made by
workers that employers were interfering with the formation of trade
unions. This was watered down in the final proposal, which states that
monitors will give "special consideration" to complaints of anti-union
135 Proposal VI, supra note 119, app. 1, 2.5.
136 Interview with Chhorn Sokha, President of Coalition of Cambodia Apparel Workers
Democratic Unions (CCAWDU), in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Dec. 9, 2002); interview with
Jason Judd, American Center for International Labor Solidarity, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia
(Dec. 10, 2002).
137 Interview with Lejo Sibbel, Chief Technical Advisor, ILO Monitoring Program, in
Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Dec. 13, 2002).
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activities.
At first, the Chief Technical Advisor decided that in order to establish
credibility, the program would not respond to any such complaints lest the
program be charged with being too pro-worker. Now, because the Chief
Technical Advisor feels that the credibility of the program is established, he
says that the ILO has begun to respond to such complaints.
Unfortunately, it appears that the initial interference cost the ILO some
legitimacy in the eyes of unions. One leader said she once lodged
complaints to the ILO, but nothing ever happened so she no longer does. 138
Chea Vichea, President of the FTUWKC, said he had never really thought
about contacting the ILO.139 The ILO needs to think about how, from the
beginning, it can establish meaningful complaint systems, while not
alienating the various stakeholders of the projects.
iv. Focus on Cambodian Labor Law Unduly Privileges Labor Standards
over Labor Rights
One structural difficulty with monitoring the entire Cambodian Labor
Code is that it is a very comprehensive document that regulates a broad
range of issues from core labor standards to the most detailed health and
safety issues. This means that the ILO must spend a great deal of time,
often out of a monitoring visit that may be no more than half a day to a say,
on labor standards instead of labor rights. This also means that less time
can be spent developing the cores of sustainable monitoring - effective
enforcement of freedom of association and creation of space for legitimate
unions to organize.
v. Unanticipated Leverage: Buyer Pressure
One of the more interesting developments, perhaps not fully
anticipated by the project designers, is the way in which the incentive and
disciplining system has actually come to work. While I have noted the lack
of enforcement mechanisms and incentive structures in individual
factories, this has been compensated for, in some instances, through buyer
pressure. Instead of the pressure falling primarily on the quota allocation
system, weight has shifted to foreign buyers, who are subject to consumer
pressure to source from labor compliant factories. A local compliance office
of the Gap clothing company told me, for example, that Gap requires all
the factories in which they source to provide it with ILO monitoring
reports.140 An official connected to an international organization informed
me that Nike, after leaving Cambodia due to a BBC report on child labor in
one of its factories, agreed to return to two factories, provided they would
138 Interview with Chhorn Sokha, President, CCADWU, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Dec.
9,2002).
139 Interview with Chea Vichea, President, Free Trade Union of the Workers of the
Kingdom of Cambodia, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Dec. 9,2002).
140 Interview with anonymous source, Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Dec. 2, 2002).
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show Nike their ILO monitoring report.141 One factory owner told me that
it is not the ILO that has the cane, but rather the buyers.142 Ray Chew of the
Garment Manufacturers Association of Cambodia noted that the buyers
ask for the reports and that orders can be lost or acquired because of their
content.
143
This is not to say that buyer pressure is enough to compel most
factories into labor compliance. In fact, many factories do not supply goods
to companies for which this is a concern. Nevertheless, the growth in labor
compliance consciousness creates another pressure point on factories to
improve conditions. The ILO reports are clearly supplementing these
companies' own efforts, in part because the companies respect the ILO as
an institution.
V. CONCLUSION
The ILO monitoring project in Cambodia has resulted in an important
confluence of two different methods of protecting workers' rights: linking
trade with labor rights and factory monitoring. Trade linkage is most
typically directed towards improving labor rights enforcement at the state
level through better public regulation, while monitoring, most typically,
concentrates on the factory level. Here, the trade provision was designed so
that performance of the garment sector, not the government, was used as a
basis for granting extra trade benefits. Factory owners therefore have a
collective incentive to improve their labor conditions because of the quota
incentive created in the Agreement. The monitoring, as we have seen, also
serves a second function: factory owners have individual incentives to
respect workers' rights because of pressure that is exerted by purchasers
who require clean ILO reports.
The ILO has taken an important step forward in Cambodia, perhaps
beyond its comfort zone, in its approach to improving working conditions.
Factory level work that aims to improve conditions by publicizing
monitoring reports is uncharted territory for the organization, but
conceivably it will conduct more projects that incorporate factory
monitoring as a methodology. 144
141 Interview with anonymous source, Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Dec. 2, 2002).
142 Interview with Roger Tan, Owner, Thai Pore Factory, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia
(Dec. 4, 2002).
143 Interview with Ray Chew, Manager, Garment Manufacturers Association of
Cambodia, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Dec. 4, 2002).
144 There is currently one other ILO program that utilizes monitoring methodologies as a
significant aspect of its program design. This program is located in Bangladesh and works to
improve working conditions in the country's garment sector by monitoring for labor
conditions, and then showing factory management how remedying abusive conditions will
lead to improved productivity and competitiveness. This program differs significantly from
the Cambodia effort, however, in that it is non-transparent, and is not linked to a trade
agreement. For more information and a critique of this program, see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST
(formerly LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS), INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND
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The critiques of each proposal that I have made above reveal a set of
elements that the ILO and the designers of its monitoring programs ought
to consider in designing future programs. These include requirements: 1)
that all factories participate; 2) that all information generated from factory
inspections be shared equally with employers and employees; 3) that there
exist an effective compliance-based system; 4) that the ILO actively work to
build democratic and independent trade unions; 5) that respect for core
labor rights be a particular emphasis of inspections; 6) that there be
incentive structures for both individual factories and the industry as a
whole; and 7) that there be complete transparency. These elements should
also be instructive for designers of non-ILO monitoring programs,
particularly regarding compliance systems and information sharing.
It should be emphasized that this program represents an important
and momentous experiment in transparent monitoring. Yet despite the
positive steps that the ILO has taken in Cambodia, its reluctance to engage
with unions and completely share information equally between employers
and workers is disappointing. Some of the reluctance to engage with
unions likely stems from a desire to avoid politically challenging positions
where illegitimate unions exist, and where there are close and politically
charged relationships between the unions, the state, and employers. For a
political organization like the ILO, tripartite in its structure, this is a highly
challenging issue.
Long-term, sustainable enforcement of labor rights, however, requires
engagement with workers and their legitimately selected representatives,
and promotion of independent trade unions. 145 The alternative of not
engaging with any unions at all, except for in limited structures such as the
Tripartite Advisory Committee, is not a viable, long-term solution for
improving working conditions and respect of workers' rights. In many
countries, like Cambodia, there are fledgling democratic unions that are
struggling to grow, and the ILO must begin to consider how it can
differentiate such legitimate unions from their non-democratic
impersonators.
145 Indeed, the ILO's mandate, as indicated on its website, calls upon it to "promot[e] the
development of independent employers' and workers' organizations." See ILO, ABOUT THE
ILO, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/index.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2003).
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